When “We Settled” Means Settled: Eastern District of Tennessee Enforces Mediated ERISA Settlement and Awards Unum Its Fees

In Williams v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, No. 1:25-cv-61, 2026 WL 1412607 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 2026), United States District Judge Curtis L. Collier granted Unum’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation and awarded Unum its attorney fees incurred in pursuing enforcement. The decision is a sharp reminder that, at least in the Sixth Circuit, parties who say a case has “settled” in filings with the court, and who behave for months as if it has, will be held to that representation even if a written release is never signed.

Did the parties actually form a binding settlement at mediation?

Yes. Plaintiff and Unum participated in voluntary mediation with mediator Jack Townsend on November 13, 2025. That same day, the mediator circulated a term sheet outlining the agreed terms and instructed the parties to exchange Unum’s standard release, sign it, and proceed to payment. Five days later, Plaintiff’s counsel sent Unum payment instructions. Eleven days after mediation, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement with the court stating, without qualification, “this matter has settled.” A month after that, the parties filed a joint status report repeating that “[t]his matter settled on November 13, 2025,” and that “Plaintiff is expected to sign and return the settlement release shortly.” Plaintiff’s counsel even appears to have drafted the joint report’s language.

Applying federal common law alongside Tennessee contract principles (a distinction the court noted is rarely outcome determinative), Judge Collier held that the parties’ objective conduct established a meeting of the minds and mutual assent. Under RE/MAX International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2001), “[w]hen parties have agreed on the essential terms of a settlement, and all that remains is to memorialize the agreement in writing, the parties are bound by the terms of the oral agreement.” The court found that standard squarely met.

Could Plaintiff escape the agreement by refusing to sign the release?

No. Plaintiff argued that the confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions of Unum’s standard release were material terms that had never been agreed upon, and that without a signed release no enforceable contract existed. The court rejected that framing. Plaintiff did not claim that his counsel lacked authority to settle, and counsel had apparent authority on which Unum was entitled to rely. See Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. v. Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530 (6th Cir. 1986). The court emphasized that even where an attorney acts contrary to a client’s express instructions, opposing counsel may still enforce the settlement absent reason to doubt the attorney’s authority; the client’s remedy in that scenario lies in a malpractice action against counsel, not in undoing the deal.

The court also found that the term sheet’s language did not contemplate ongoing negotiation. Its repeated use of “will” was directive, not conditional, and it described a release that “will be returned” after “review and acceptance” rather than further bargaining. Combined with Plaintiff’s payment instructions, his two court filings confirming settlement, and his counsel’s repeated assurances over a three-month period that Plaintiff “isn’t backing out” and that no issues were anticipated beyond the delay in signing, the record overwhelmingly showed an executed agreement that merely awaited memorialization.

What about the confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions Plaintiff says he never agreed to?

The court treated those provisions as non-material to the broader settlement. Plaintiff’s counsel had negotiated similar agreements with Unum’s counsel before and was familiar with Unum’s standard form. There was no allegation of mutual mistake or lack of awareness of those terms. The evidence suggested only that counsel had not appreciated the restrictions’ implications for Plaintiff’s other legal proceedings, or that Plaintiff would object to them. That kind of belated, client-side dissatisfaction does not unwind a contract once mutual assent has been objectively manifested.

Why did the court award Unum its attorney fees?

Applying the five-factor framework drawn from Secretary of Department of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1985), and Foltice v. Guardsman Products, Inc., 98 F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 1996), the court found four of the five factors favored fees and the fifth was not relevant.

On culpability and bad faith, the court drew a careful distinction. Plaintiff’s counsel was genuinely trying to get his client to sign, and the court did not find intentional delay on counsel’s part. But Plaintiff himself, the court found, acted in bad faith: he twice told the court in writing that the case had settled, sent payment instructions, then reversed course months later and took the position that no settlement existed. Communication between Plaintiff and his own counsel had broken down so badly that Unum learned Plaintiff would not sign before counsel did.

On ability to pay, the court presumed Plaintiff would have sufficient settlement funds to satisfy a fee award. On deterrent effect, the court emphasized the value of discouraging litigants from reneging on settlements after making contrary representations to the court and to opposing counsel. The common-benefit factor was not relevant. And on the relative merits, the evidence was “overwhelming” in Unum’s favor, largely on the strength of Plaintiff’s own filings and communications.

Disposition

The court granted Unum’s motion to enforce the settlement, directed the parties to file a stipulation for dismissal by June 5, 2026, and directed Unum to file a ledger of work performed exclusively in connection with enforcement of the settlement so that a reasonable fee award could be calculated.