Sixth Circuit Upholds Denial of Post-Remand Attorney’s Fees in ERISA Dispute Over Health Plan Benefits

In Canter v. Alkermes Blue Care Elect Preferred Provider Plan, No. 24-3926, 2025 WL 2058997 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to award post-remand attorney’s fees to a successful ERISA claimant, holding that the court properly exercised its discretion in denying additional compensation for work performed after the claimant had already secured key relief through administrative remand.

Keith Canter brought suit under ERISA after his employer-sponsored health plan, administered by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBSMA), denied coverage for two spinal surgeries totaling more than $85,000. After filing in federal court, Canter successfully secured an order remanding the claim to BCBSMA for reconsideration. The insurer reversed its original decision and paid the full benefit amount.

Canter then sought—and was awarded—attorney’s fees for his pre-remand legal work, amounting to over $204,000, along with prejudgment interest and costs. The district court emphasized his “success on the merits” in obtaining a remand that led directly to payment of his claims.

But Canter did not stop there. He filed additional motions post-remand, including motions to reopen the case, seek prejudgment interest, and request further attorney’s fees. When he sought compensation for this post-remand legal work, the district court declined. Canter appealed that denial.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Writing for the panel, Judge Ritz explained that ERISA does not mandate attorney’s fees even where a plaintiff prevails. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), such awards are discretionary. Once a plaintiff achieves “some success on the merits,” courts may consider the King factors to guide their fee analysis: (1) the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2) their ability to pay; (3) deterrent effect; (4) whether the litigation conferred a common benefit; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.

In Canter’s case, the district court reasonably separated the litigation into two phases—pre-remand and post-remand—and concluded that only the former justified fee-shifting. While Canter argued that all post-remand litigation was a direct consequence of BCBSMA’s initial denial and therefore compensable, the court found that much of the work lacked merit or did not enhance the relief already achieved.

Significantly, the district court had already awarded prejudgment interest and recognized Canter’s earlier success. But when it turned to the post-remand activity, it found no grounds to extend additional compensation. The Sixth Circuit found this careful bifurcation entirely within the district court’s discretion.

This decision is a reminder that while ERISA plaintiffs can be entitled to attorney’s fees, such awards are not automatic—and certainly not limitless. Courts are free to distinguish between litigation efforts that meaningfully advance a claim and those that do not.

Here, Canter achieved substantial success, but the courts drew a clear line: once the plan reversed its denial and paid the claims, the remaining litigation did not justify further fee recovery. The case highlights the importance of focusing fee petitions on work that demonstrably contributes to obtaining or securing benefits under the plan.