When Do ERISA Attorney-Fee Motions Run Out of Time? A Michigan Court Denies Fees on Timeliness and the King Factors

In McEachin v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, No. 2:21-CV-12819, 2026 WL 2391210 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2026), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied a long-term disability claimant’s second motion for attorney fees under ERISA, holding that her request for appellate fees was untimely and that, in any event, the governing multi-factor test did not support an award. The Honorable Terrence G. Berg issued the order. Plaintiff had previously stopped working following two car accidents and mental health challenges after her son’s death, and the underlying benefit dispute had already been resolved through an earlier judgment, a Sixth Circuit affirmance, and a stipulated order directing payment of benefits for a defined period.

What fees was Plaintiff seeking?

Plaintiff sought two categories of attorney fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1): fees for work performed in connection with the appellate litigation in the Sixth Circuit, and fees for work performed in the district court following remand. The Court analyzed each category separately, both as to timeliness and as to the merits of the fee request.

Why did the Court find the appellate-fee request untimely?

Under Local Rule 54.1.2(a), a motion for attorney fees must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of judgment, with “judgment” defined to include any order from which an appeal lies. The Court held that the time to request appellate fees ran from the Sixth Circuit’s judgment or mandate. The Sixth Circuit issued its opinion on November 13, 2024, and its mandate on December 30, 2024. Plaintiff did not file the fee motion until November 17, 2025, nearly a year later. The Court therefore denied the request for appellate fees as untimely. The Court found the request for post-remand district court fees timely, however, because it was filed within 28 days of the October 20, 2025 stipulated order.

How did the Court apply the King factors to an ERISA fee request?

The Court explained that a district court may award reasonable attorney fees where a claimant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, and that it weighs the five King factors: the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith, that party’s ability to satisfy an award, the deterrent effect of an award, whether the requesting party sought to confer a common benefit or resolve significant ERISA questions, and the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Critically, the Court held under Schwartz v. Gregori that these factors are measured against the conduct for which compensation is sought, not against the defendant’s underlying conduct. Because Plaintiff sought appellate and post-remand fees, the Court asked whether Defendant pursued the appeal, and litigated on remand, in bad faith, rather than whether Defendant’s original benefit decision was culpable. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the presence of a cross-appeal took the case outside Schwartz, noting that Schwartz itself involved a cross-appeal.

How did each factor come out?

The Court found that three factors favored Defendant and one favored Plaintiff, with one neutral. On culpability, the Court found no bad faith in Defendant’s appeal, observing that the appeal sought to restore a magistrate judge’s recommendation, and no bad faith in Defendant’s post-remand advocacy. The ability-to-satisfy factor favored Plaintiff, as Defendant is a large national insurer able to pay a fee award. The deterrent-effect factor favored Defendant, because parties should not be deterred from appealing unresolved ERISA questions or from settling their disputes. The common-benefit factor favored Defendant, because Plaintiff neither conferred a common benefit nor resolved a significant ERISA question, given that her first argument was rejected and her second was never reached on remand. The relative-merits factor was neutral. Weighing the factors, the Court concluded that a fee award would not be reasonable and denied the motion.