ERISA Fiduciary Breach: When Your Employer’s Benefits Advice Is Wrong, You May Have a Claim

In Williams v. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC Benefits and Investment Committee, No. 24-cv-07593-VC, 2026 WL 1865363 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2026), United States District Judge Vince Chhabria granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim, and denied the defendants’ cross-motion in full. The court held that the plan fiduciaries breached their ERISA duties by giving Plaintiff materially false benefits advice, but found that a trial is needed to determine what monetary relief Plaintiff can recover.

What ERISA fiduciary breach claim did Plaintiff bring?

Plaintiff worked for LLNS for roughly three decades before becoming disabled. Two LLNS employees, a benefits adviser and a retirement counselor, met with Plaintiff and his wife one-on-one to counsel him on his options. He could retire or enroll in one or both of two disability programs. Based on their advice, Plaintiff chose to go on disability and enrolled in both LLNS’s traditional long-term disability program and its Defined Benefit Eligible Disability program. The two employees led him to believe that enrolling in the second program would earn him pension credit for his time on disability, increasing his eventual monthly pension. That was wrong. Plaintiff received no pension credit for that time.

Were the LLNS employees acting as ERISA fiduciaries?

Yes. The court explained that to win an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim based on misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show the defendant was a fiduciary acting as one, made a material misrepresentation, and that the plaintiff reasonably relied on it to his detriment. The defendants argued the two employees were not acting as fiduciaries when they spoke with Plaintiff. The court rejected that. It found that individualized consultations with benefits counselors are a fiduciary function, that conveying information about the likely future of plan benefits is a fiduciary act, and that the retirement counselor’s title and her later role as Delegate of Plan Administrator strongly indicated she was entrusted with discretion. The court held as a matter of law that both employees were acting as functional ERISA fiduciaries when they advised Plaintiff.

Does an unintentional misstatement violate ERISA?

The court found that it can. The defendants argued that an unintentional error in counseling cannot support a fiduciary breach claim unless the plan language on the same topic is also ambiguous. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that ERISA imposes an affirmative duty on fiduciaries to convey complete and accurate information material to a beneficiary’s circumstances, even when the beneficiary has not asked. A statement can be materially misleading even when the plan documents are clear, and the leading Ninth Circuit authority does not require accompanying ambiguous plan language.

Was the LLNS pension plan language ambiguous anyway?

The court found that it was, and described it as “embarrassingly ambiguous.” One section of the pension plan stated that a member accrues credited service while enrolled in the defined benefit disability program, and that credited service equals service for the performance of duties. A later section calculating retirement income stated that service earned while enrolled in that program does not count toward pension benefits. The court found this direct contradiction created an obvious ambiguity and rejected the defendants’ argument that the first provision referenced some other benefit, calling that reading unsupportable given that the document is titled a pension plan and discusses no other benefit.

Did Plaintiff reasonably rely on the bad advice?

Yes. The defendants argued Plaintiff could not show reasonable reliance because he had not shown he read the plan documents. The court found this overstated the law. Whether reliance is reasonable is a context-specific inquiry, not a categorical duty ERISA places on beneficiaries to consult plan documents. Given that LLNS representatives charged with counseling employees advised Plaintiff against a backdrop of hopelessly ambiguous plan language, the court found no genuine dispute that Plaintiff reasonably relied to his detriment. The court granted Plaintiff summary judgment on liability.

Why did the court deny summary judgment on the remedy?

The court explained that Plaintiff’s monetary relief depends on whether he proceeds under equitable estoppel or surcharge, and that a trial is necessary either way to set the amount. On equitable estoppel, the court found insufficient evidence on the intent element, noting that statements like “you must enroll” can reflect either an intent to induce action or a disinterested recommendation. On surcharge, the court found gaps in the record about how Plaintiff was actually harmed and questioned the assumptions underlying his damages calculations. The court directed the parties to brief whether the intent question can be resolved as a matter of law before the pretrial conference.