Northern District of California Upholds ERISA Severance Denial Where Plan Administrator Used Shortest-Driving-Distance to Measure Commute

In Foley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 25-cv-04795-EMC, 2026 WL 1805741 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2026), United States District Judge Edward M. Chen granted the defendant’s motion for judgment and denied the plaintiff’s, holding that Wells Fargo did not abuse its discretion when it denied severance benefits under its ERISA-governed severance plan. The dispute turned on whether the plaintiff’s commute to a new office location qualified as a “Substantial Position Change,” which the Plan defined in part by reference to a “Reasonable Commute Distance.”

What benefits did the Plaintiff seek under ERISA?

Plaintiff worked remotely as a Senior Systems Quality Assurance Analyst until Wells Fargo terminated his ability to work from home and directed him to report to an office in Concord, California. Plaintiff claimed severance benefits on the theory that the new commute exceeded a “Reasonable Commute Distance,” which the Plan defined to require, among other things, a resultant commute from home to the new work site exceeding 40 miles one way. Wells Fargo calculated the distance at 33.1 miles using the Bing Maps API configured to return the shortest driving distance, and it denied the claim and the subsequent appeal.

What standard of review applied to the ERISA denial?

The Court applied abuse of discretion review because the Plan unambiguously vested the administrator with full, exclusive, and discretionary authority to interpret its terms. Plaintiff argued that the standard should shift to de novo review for two reasons, and the Court rejected both. First, Plaintiff contended that Wells Fargo committed wholesale and flagrant procedural violations by concealing the computational basis for its denial. The Court disagreed, finding that Wells Fargo disclosed in its initial denial that it used a Microsoft mapping service relying on the shortest absolute route, and identified Bing in the appeal denial. The Court held that Wells Fargo’s failure to specify the exact API parameter was not critical. Second, Plaintiff argued that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(l) mandated de novo review, but the Court explained that the regulation governs exhaustion of administrative remedies, not the standard of review, and that no Ninth Circuit authority reads it to compel de novo review.

Did the Plan administrator reasonably interpret “Reasonable Commute Distance”?

The Court held that Wells Fargo reasonably interpreted “commute (measured in miles)” to mean the shortest driving distance, irrespective of travel time. The Court reasoned that the Plan tied the measurement to miles and did not reference time or other variables, and that the shortest-driving-distance approach produced an objective, uniform result free from the variability that would attend route choices based on traffic, time of day, or personal preference. The Court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the denial rested on an unverifiable “bare result,” noting that Wells Fargo produced the worksheet generated by the API and that Plaintiff’s own testing using the consumer Bing Maps interface returned routes under 40 miles. The Court added that even under de novo review, its interpretation would align with the administrator’s.

What were the procedural claims, and how did the Court treat them?

Plaintiff also asserted claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1133 and 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 for inadequate notice and unreasonable claims procedures. Plaintiff conceded in briefing that these provisions do not create independent private rights of action and that the claims were not advanced as separate remedial bases. The Court accordingly addressed only the claim for benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Concluding that the administrator’s interpretation was neither illogical, implausible, nor without record support, the Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment and denied Plaintiff’s.