Third Circuit Rejects ERISA “Equitable Relief” Claim Duplicative of Benefit Claim and Affirms Denial of Pension Appeal

In Carr v. Jefferson Defined Benefit Plan, et al., No. 24-2574, 2025 WL 2888014 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), a non-precedential opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that a former hospital employee could not repackage her claim for denied pension benefits as an “equitable relief” claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The court found that the plaintiff’s fiduciary-duty claim merely duplicated her claim for benefits and was therefore barred, reinforcing that ERISA § 502(a)(3) cannot be used to recover the same monetary relief available under § 502(a)(1)(B), and highlights the limits of “equitable surcharge” theories following CIGNA v. Amara. The court also upheld the plan administrator’s denial of benefits as non-arbitrary and the district court’s award of a modest penalty for delayed disclosure of plan information.

Plaintiff Alice Carr worked part-time for Abington Memorial Hospital from 1997 to 2013 and participated in the hospital’s defined benefit pension plan (the “Abington Plan”). In 2018, the plan merged into the Jefferson Defined Benefit Plan following Thomas Jefferson University’s acquisition of Abington. Under the Abington Plan, a participant became vested after completing at least 1,000 hours of qualifying service in a calendar year for five years. Both parties agreed Carr met that standard in four years—2003, 2010, 2011, and 2012—but disputed whether she worked 1,000 qualifying hours in 1997, the first year of her employment.

In 2022, Carr applied for pension benefits. The Jefferson Plan denied her claim, relying on service-hour summaries from a third-party recordkeeper. Carr appealed internally, but the Plan upheld the denial. She then filed suit under ERISA in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania asserting three counts: (1) Benefits due under § 502(a)(1)(B); (2) Statutory penalties for delayed disclosure of a pension statement under §§ 1025(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 1132(c)(1); and (3) Equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3).

The district court dismissed portions of the complaint, ruled against Carr on the benefit claim, granted a $4,070 penalty for a delayed pension statement, and rejected her equitable-relief theory as duplicative. Carr appealed.

Judge Hardiman, writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed on all grounds. The core of Carr’s appeal was the dismissal of her fiduciary-duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3). She argued that she sought distinct equitable relief—such as injunction or surcharge—beyond her request for benefits. The Third Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that both claims sought the same relief: payment of her pension benefits.

The court described her equitable count as “a claim for her pension benefits dressed in the cloak of equity.” Reframing a monetary claim as a fiduciary claim does not convert it into equitable relief. The panel cited Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), which limits § 502(a)(3) to “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity,” excluding “specific performance of a past-due monetary obligation.”

Carr invoked CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011), to argue that an “equitable surcharge” could provide monetary redress for fiduciary breaches. The Third Circuit acknowledged the ongoing circuit split on whether a surcharge is available and whether plaintiffs may plead alternative claims under both §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3). But the court found it unnecessary to resolve those questions because Carr’s complaint sought no remedy beyond the benefits themselves—rendering her equitable claim duplicative and therefore barred under Great-West. “Counsel’s use of the term ‘surcharge’ was artful pleading intended to reframe her Count I request for retirement benefits as equitable,” the court observed. “She is not actually seeking a surcharge.”

Carr also faulted the district court for not permitting amendment of her complaint. The Third Circuit noted she never sought leave to amend nor provided a proposed amended pleading, which is required under Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007). Outside civil-rights contexts, courts are not obliged to offer amendment sua sponte.

Carr filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e), but the court properly construed it as a motion for reconsideration subject to a 14-day local deadline, because the dismissal of one count was not a final judgment. The motion was therefore untimely.

On her disclosure claim, Carr contended the plan’s December 2021 letter did not satisfy ERISA § 105(a) because it omitted the earliest vesting date and failed to include wage and personnel data. The Third Circuit disagreed, finding the letter adequately listed her accrued and non-forfeitable benefits and was “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant.” The plan administrator’s 37-day delay in providing that statement justified the $4,070 penalty, but no further relief was warranted. The panel also held that personnel and wage records fall outside § 105(a)’s disclosure obligations.

Finally, Carr challenged the district court’s refusal to strike the defendants’ late-filed answer. The Third Circuit upheld the ruling, citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993): the district court reasonably found no prejudice to Carr and excusable neglect on the defendants’ part.