W.D. Wisconsin Awards Six Figures in Attorney’s Fees Following Reinstatement of LTD Benefits for Internal Medicine Physician, Finding Hartford’s Termination Indefensible Under Its Own Policy

In Ryan v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., No. 21-cv-592-wmc, 2026 WL 1146274 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 2026), District Judge William M. Conley granted Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), awarding $151,612.50 in fees and $402.00 in costs following the reinstatement of Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits on remand.

Background
Plaintiff, an internal medicine physician, filed a claim for long-term disability benefits in August 2018 after sustaining a fall and suffering a concussion. Hartford initially approved her LTD claim and, under the terms of the policy, required her to apply for Social Security Disability benefits, which the SSA approved on July 31, 2019. Mere days later, however, Hartford’s claim examiner found it “unclear if disability is supported,” and in March 2020 terminated Plaintiff’s benefits, notwithstanding that she continued to qualify as disabled under the SSA’s more stringent standard. At summary judgment, the court found Hartford acted arbitrarily and capriciously on three grounds: failure to adequately consider the demanding nature of Plaintiff’s occupation as an internist; failure to address the weight owed to her SSA award; and Hartford’s structural conflict of interest as both the eligibility determiner and benefits payor. The court ordered an administrative remand, on which Plaintiff’s benefits were reinstated and backpay awarded, leaving only the fee motion to resolve.

Eligibility for Fees
Hartford argued that Plaintiff lacked “some success on the merits” under Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010), characterizing the remand as a “purely procedural” victory. The court rejected that argument as unsupported by circuit precedent and, in any event, moot, since benefits had since been reinstated and backpay received. Plaintiff’s eligibility was therefore established.

Entitlement to Fees
The court applied the Seventh Circuit’s five-factor test, finding all five factors favored Plaintiff. First, Hartford’s ability as a large insurer to satisfy the award weighed heavily in favor of fees, as did the deterrence rationale: Hartford, like an increasing number of ERISA defendants with a dual role in determining eligibility and paying benefits, had economic incentives to deny legitimate claims, making an offsetting fee award appropriate. On culpability and relative merits, the court acknowledged the record contained conflicting medical evidence and that summary judgment was a “close call,” but nonetheless found Hartford’s position without merit in light of its complete failure to compare Plaintiff’s residual cognitive function to the actual demands of her occupation, and its disregard of the SSA award despite being on notice of prior adverse decisions on the same issue. The court noted this was not Hartford’s first termination where it failed to give due weight to a contrary SSA determination, citing cases from 2002 and 2019. Factor four, though less relevant in individual cases, also favored Plaintiff, as fees would incentivize insurers to consider favorable SSA determinations before terminating benefits.

Reasonableness of Fees
The court declined Hartford’s request for a blanket reduction based on lack of success, finding Plaintiff’s victory essentially complete. On specific reductions, First, the court declined to exclude fees for the Rule 59 motion for reinstatement, which was withdrawn as moot after Plaintiff prevailed on remand, reasoning it was part of the common core of facts underlying her overall success and “but one of the paths” to ultimate victory under Stark v. PPM Am., Inc., 354 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2004). Second, the court excluded 12.45 hours ($6,167.50) billed by counsel for purely clerical tasks, consistent with Seventh Circuit practice barring recovery of administrative time even when performed by an attorney. Third, the court allowed 74 hours for reviewing the 2,916-page administrative record, crediting counsel’s meticulous review that uncovered over 200 pages of documents missing from Hartford’s initial disclosure. Fourth, the court allowed 6.5 hours for correspondence regarding the administrative record, finding Hartford’s objection largely conclusory. Fifth, the court allowed 4.6 hours of travel time for in-person mediation attendance, noting that Plaintiff’s specific medical conditions made screen-based communication for extended periods unreasonable and that the Seventh Circuit permits billing travel time based on associated opportunity costs.

Costs
The court excluded $980.50 in mediation fees and travel mileage, finding them outside the six categories of recoverable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which the Seventh Circuit requires be interpreted narrowly. Plaintiff did not respond to Hartford’s argument on this point, and the court did not exercise discretion to allow the costs. The resulting award was $402.00.

Ryan is a useful practitioner reference on the interplay between SSA awards and LTD terminations. The court’s observation that this was not Hartford’s first termination in the face of a contrary SSA determination, and its explicit framing of the fee award as a deterrent to that pattern, signals that repeat conduct of this kind will bear weight in the entitlement analysis.