Can an ERISA Claimant Get Discovery Beyond the Administrative Record? Minnesota Court Permits Extra-Record Discovery on a Separately Pleaded Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Claim Against Unum

In Gibson v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, No. 25-2711 (JWB/JFD), 2026 WL 2983259 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2026), a Minnesota federal court allowed an ERISA long-term disability claimant to take discovery outside the administrative record on his separately pleaded breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, overruling the insurer’s objections to a magistrate judge’s order that had permitted that discovery.

How did a long-term disability denial lead to a discovery fight?

Plaintiff sued Unum after it denied his claim for long-term disability benefits. His complaint asserted two ERISA claims: Count I sought benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and Count II sought equitable relief under § 1132(a)(3) based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in Unum’s handling of the claim. The discovery dispute concerned only Count II. Plaintiff sought information about Unum’s claims-handling process, including a conversation between his treating physician and an Unum physician reviewer, whether the Unum reviewer accurately reported that conversation, and why Unum continued to rely on the reviewer after Plaintiff raised concerns about the account. Magistrate Judge John Docherty granted Plaintiff’s motion to conduct discovery beyond the administrative record on Count II, and Unum objected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).

What did Unum have to show to overturn the magistrate judge’s order?

The court reviewed the nondispositive discovery order under a deferential standard, setting it aside only if it was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. As the court framed it, the question was not whether extra-record discovery would have been granted in the first instance, but whether Magistrate Judge Docherty clearly erred or acted contrary to law in allowing discovery directed to the separately pleaded § 1132(a)(3) claim.

Why did the court allow discovery beyond the administrative record?

The court grounded its ruling in Eighth Circuit precedent. In Silva v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 762 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2014), the Eighth Circuit held that Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), does not require a plaintiff to elect between § 1132(a)(1)(B) and § 1132(a)(3) at the pleading stage; Varity instead prohibits duplicate recovery. The court found Jones v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 856 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 2017), even more directly applicable. There, as here, the plaintiff asserted both a disability-benefits claim and a fiduciary-duty claim challenging the claims-handling process, and the Eighth Circuit held that the two counts asserted different theories of liability and could both be pleaded, with liability under § 1132(a)(3) flowing from the allegedly improper process rather than the denial itself. Because Plaintiff’s allegations likewise concerned the claims-handling process, the court concluded that discovery could uncover information relevant to the fiduciary-duty claim that was not contained in the administrative record, and that allowing it was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

Does de novo review of the benefits claim limit fiduciary-duty discovery?

Unum argued that because the benefits claim would be reviewed de novo, alleged deficiencies in its decision-making process were irrelevant. The court rejected that reasoning. The discovery order did not expand the record on the benefits claim; it was directed to Count II. Whether evidence about Unum’s claims-handling process was material to the independent determination of disability under Count I was a different question from whether it was relevant to the separately pleaded fiduciary-duty theory. The court also addressed Unum’s reliance on 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(l)(2), explaining that Plaintiff’s Count II allegations were not limited to a regulatory failure to provide a full and fair review but included alleged factual misrepresentations, so the court did not need to decide whether a regulatory violation standing alone could support relief under § 1132(a)(3).

What limits did the court place on the discovery?

The court emphasized that affirmance did not authorize open-ended discovery. Rule 26 continued to govern relevance and proportionality and remained available to address cumulative, duplicative, or disproportionate requests as the case proceeded. The court also declined to treat ERISA’s interest in the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of benefits disputes as a reason to eliminate otherwise relevant discovery on a fiduciary-duty theory recognized by Eighth Circuit precedent.

Did the ruling decide whether the fiduciary-duty claim survives?

No. The court was careful to note that affirming the discovery order did not decide whether Count II ultimately succeeds or whether any recovery on it would duplicate relief available under Count I. Magistrate Judge Docherty had expressly declined to address the merits of the fiduciary-duty claim, and the court observed that Silva left open whether a plaintiff may later be required to elect which theory to pursue once full discovery is complete. Unum therefore remains free to challenge Count II at a later stage.

Finally, the court denied Plaintiff’s request for the attorney’s fees he incurred in responding to Unum’s objections, concluding that although Unum did not prevail, its objections raised nonfrivolous questions about the scope of discovery and the relationship between §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(a)(3).