An ERISA Plaintiff Tries to Leave the Forum She Chose: S.D. Fla. Says Yes, but at a Cost

In Bennett v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, No. 25-CV-21039-RAR, 2026 WL 2450695 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2026), United States District Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz II granted in part Plaintiff’s motion to transfer or, in the alternative, dismiss her ERISA long-term disability action, dismissing the case without prejudice on the condition that she pay Defendant’s costs if she refiles. The court declined to transfer the case to New York, rejected the Magistrate Judge’s improper-venue reasoning, and refused to include attorney’s fees within the costs Plaintiff would owe on any refiling. Because the ruling is procedural, the court did not address the underlying denial of benefits, and it denied both parties’ pending summary judgment motions as moot.

Was venue actually improper in this ERISA case?

No, and this is where the court parted ways with the Report and Recommendation below. The Magistrate Judge had recommended dismissal on the theory that venue was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, pointing to the complaint’s failure to plead venue. Judge Ruiz rejected that reasoning. ERISA contains its own venue provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), allowing suit where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found. The Eleventh Circuit has called that provision liberal and broad. Because Hartford is a nationwide insurer that does business in the Southern District of Florida, it can be found there, and venue was proper. The court also noted that Hartford never contested venue in its answer and litigated the case in the district for over a year, and that Plaintiff’s own motion did not actually argue improper venue.

Why did the court refuse to transfer the case to New York?

Because venue was proper, Plaintiff’s transfer request fell under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which turns on convenience and the interests of justice, not on § 1406. The court applied the two-step § 1404(a) test, and while the parties agreed the case could have been brought in New York, the convenience factors weighed against transfer. Plaintiff filed the case seventeen months earlier, the parties had mediated, held a settlement conference, and filed cross-motions for summary judgment, placing the case at its final stages. The court also observed that an ERISA benefits action following an administrative appeal resembles record-based appellate review and dispositive motion practice rather than a triable case with live witnesses, which diminishes the usual convenience rationale for transfer. It further noted that Plaintiff waited more than a year to seek transfer and had earlier fought to keep the case in the district.

On what basis did the court dismiss the case?

The court construed Plaintiff’s alternative request as a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which Defendant had not opposed in its response to the motion. Because a defendant that has answered or moved for summary judgment can obtain dismissal only by court order on proper terms, the court granted the unopposed request but turned to whether conditions were warranted. It declined to consider Defendant’s procedural objections to the dismissal request, since Defendant raised them for the first time in its objections rather than before the Magistrate Judge, but it agreed to consider Defendant’s alternative request for a cost-and-fee condition on any refiling.

Why did ERISA matter to the attorney’s fees ruling?

This is the portion of the decision with the most doctrinal reach. Defendant asked the court to condition dismissal on Plaintiff paying its attorney’s fees and costs under Rule 41(d) if she refiled the same claim. The court surveyed the circuit split on whether Rule 41(d) costs include attorney’s fees, noting the Sixth Circuit’s categorical no, the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ discretionary yes, and the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ middle position allowing fees only when the underlying statute treats fees as costs. The Eleventh Circuit has not resolved the question. The court declined to include fees for two reasons: the plain text of Rule 41(d) authorizes costs but is silent on fees, and ERISA itself, in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g), expressly distinguishes between costs and attorney’s fees. Following the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ approach, the court held that ERISA’s own structure counseled against treating fees as recoverable costs here.

What condition did the court actually impose?

The court dismissed the case without prejudice but ruled that if Plaintiff refiles the same action in any district, Defendant may move for Plaintiff to pay the costs, not the attorney’s fees, it incurred in this suit. Rule 41(d)’s text expressly permits a cost condition, and the court reasoned that requiring costs on any refiling protected Defendant’s interest in not paying twice to defend the same litigation, given that Plaintiff could have accepted an earlier dismissal without prejudice when her prior counsel withdrew. The court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as moot and did not reach the merits of the benefits claim.