When Is an ERISA “Regular Occupation” Your Specialty? Court Orders Unum to Reinstate a Securities Lawyer’s Disability Benefits

In Macpeak v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, No. 24-1650, 2026 WL 2906206 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to a long-term disability claimant and ordered Unum to retroactively reinstate the benefits it had terminated, holding that the insurer abused its discretion under ERISA by measuring the claimant against the generic duties of an attorney rather than the duties of her actual legal specialty, as the plan required.

What occupation did the plan require Unum to evaluate?

Plaintiff is a securities lawyer who practices at a large firm, where she researches regulatory law and drafts documents for mutual funds and other investment products, interacts with clients, and supervises junior associates. She suffers from migraines and cyclical vomiting syndrome, and Unum paid her long-term disability benefits from September 2017 through November 2023. The plan defines disability by reference to the insured’s “regular occupation,” and for attorneys it defines that term as the attorney’s “specialty in the practice of law” that the attorney is routinely performing when the disability begins. That definition differs from the one the plan applies to non-attorneys, whose regular occupation is assessed as it is normally performed in the national economy.

How did Unum evaluate the claim?

A 2019 vocational review assessed Plaintiff as a generic “Attorney” as performed in the national economy, using an eDOT code, and listed a broad array of general attorney duties that had nothing to do with her specialty, including performing trial work, conducting pretrial preparation, defending the organization in lawsuits, applying for patents, settling labor disputes, and teaching college courses. Although the reviewer acknowledged Plaintiff’s securities work in the introduction, she then ignored it and applied the generalist profile. When Unum moved to terminate benefits, it asked three physicians, Dr. Jones, Dr. McCarthy, and Dr. Gross, to evaluate whether Plaintiff could perform the general physical and cognitive demands of an attorney. Each measured her against those generic demands rather than the duties of a securities lawyer, and the termination letter did the same.

Why did the court find an abuse of discretion?

The parties agreed the plan conferred discretionary authority, so the court applied the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. Even under that standard, the court explained, an administrator’s interpretation may not conflict with the plain language of the plan. The plan required Unum to assess whether Plaintiff was limited in performing the material and substantial duties of her legal specialty, and Unum instead treated her as a generalist. Citing the Third Circuit’s decisions in Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. and Patrick v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the court held that an administrator acts unreasonably when it relies on generalized national occupational databases to dilute or mischaracterize the demands of an insured’s true occupation. The court found the record devoid of any indication that Unum ever measured Plaintiff’s limitations against her actual duties, and it drew support from the First Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Standard Insurance Co., which rejected reliance on a generic-lawyer description over the material duties of a claimant’s specialized practice. Because Unum failed to adhere to the plain language of the plan, it abused its discretion. The court declined to reach Plaintiff’s remaining arguments regarding a lack of material change in her condition and an alleged violation of Department of Labor regulations.

What remedy did the court order?

The court distinguished between an erroneous initial denial, which generally warrants a remand, and an improper termination of previously approved benefits, which warrants reinstatement. Because Unum arbitrarily terminated benefits it had already approved and paid for years, the court ordered retroactive reinstatement rather than remand, and it granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment while denying Unum’s cross-motion.