Seventh Circuit Affirms Denial of Survivor Benefits Where Power of Attorney Lacked Express Authority to Waive Spousal Annuity Rights Under ERISA

In Havlik v. University of Chicago, No. 25-2821, — F.4th —-, 2026 WL 2084784 (7th Cir. July 20, 2026), a suit for ERISA benefits, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the University of Chicago, its two Section 403(b) retirement plans, and TIAA, the plans’ recordkeeper, holding that an attempted change to a surviving spouse’s survivor annuity rights was invalid because the agent who executed the spousal waiver lacked the express grant of authority required under Wisconsin law. Edward Lyon, a University of Chicago physician, participated in the university’s contributory and supplemental retirement plans, both ERISA-qualified. The plans’ default form of payment for a married participant was a 50% joint and survivor annuity, and both the plans and 29 U.S.C. § 1055 required a written, notarized spousal waiver before a participant could designate a non-spouse beneficiary. In 1998, Edward designated his wife Valerie and a family trust as beneficiaries, with Valerie’s notarized consent. In 2014, Valerie executed a Wisconsin statutory power of attorney appointing her son-in-law, Daniel Davies, as her agent; the instrument contained a general grant of authority and special instructions permitting Davies to name or change beneficiaries, but did not expressly authorize him to waive Valerie’s survivor annuity rights. In November 2019, weeks before Edward’s death, Davies submitted a beneficiary change form on Valerie’s behalf designating trusts for the couple’s grandchildren and removing Valerie as a primary beneficiary. TIAA rejected the form, and the university, as plan administrator, later denied the resulting claim on the ground that Wisconsin law required a specific grant of authority to waive spousal survivor benefits. Plaintiffs, as trustees of Edward’s trust, sued under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and asserted alternative claims for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3) against the university and TIAA and for negligence against TIAA. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants.

Reviewing de novo because the denial rested on an interpretation of law, the Seventh Circuit held that the validity of the 2019 waiver turned on Wisconsin’s Uniform Power of Attorney for Finances and Property Act, Chapter 244 of the Wisconsin statutes. The court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 244.41(1)(f), which permits an agent to waive the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan, only if the power of attorney expressly grants that authority, governed the action Davies sought to perform. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the more general provision in § 244.51(2)(i), governing estates, trusts, and beneficial interests and requiring only a general grant of authority, applied instead, reasoning that the specific statutory provision controlled over the general one and that reading Chapter 244 as a whole confirmed that waiver of spousal survivor rights was placed in the only subsection requiring an express grant. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the benefit was not a joint and survivor annuity, explaining that the annuity was the default form of payment and that the 1998 designation form had not effected a qualified election changing that form. Because Valerie’s power of attorney contained no express grant authorizing Davies to waive her survivor annuity rights, the waiver was invalid and the claim for benefits failed. Having found the waiver invalid under Wisconsin law, the court declined to decide whether a waiver executed by an agent within the scope of a power of attorney would separately satisfy Section 1055.

The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, concluding that the proposed question misstated the issue by framing it around a lump-sum payment and that the validity of the 2019 waiver was a fact-specific matter unsuitable for certification. The court also affirmed judgment on the alternative claims. The breach of fiduciary duty claim failed because the university had acted in accordance with the law and the plans’ requirements, and Plaintiffs had not shown that the university’s response time in notifying them of the rejection was unreasonable under any duty recognized by ERISA. The negligence claim against TIAA failed for the same reason and was independently preempted by ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1144, because TIAA’s recordkeeping role was central to plan administration, and the court noted that TIAA was not a fiduciary under the plans. The district court’s judgment was affirmed.